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The IDEA’s Stay-Put Provision:
A Staple of Pandemic IEP Litigation?
Natalie Granda†

I.

INTRODUCTION

School closures in the wake of COVID-19 have caused major disruptions in the lives of our nation’s students.1 Following the widespread
closures of schools in March of 2020, concerns for students have ranged
widely, from social and emotional development, to physical and nutritional wellbeing, to academic progress and achievement.2 Students with
disabilities are significantly and disproportionately affected by the closures, as they often rely upon school-based services crucial to their academic progress.3 Students with physical or mental disabilities, for example, face significant—if not insurmountable—difficulties in adapting
to remote instruction.4 These problems are only exacerbated in cases
where the student with disabilities lacks access to the technology required for successful distance learning.5
Despite the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic presents for
students requiring special educational services, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act6 (“the IDEA” or “the Act”) maintains the
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1
See Betheny Gross & Alice Opalka, Too Many Schools Leave Learning to Chance During the
Pandemic, CTR. FOR REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. (June 2020), https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/final_national_sample_brief_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS6Z-EPPA].
2
See The Importance of Reopening America’s Schools This Fall, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (updated July 23, 2020), http://ww11.doh.state.fl.us/comm/_partners
/covid19_school_resources_links/the_importance_of_reopening_americas_schools_this_fall_cdc.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9HE-ETCF].
3
See id.
4
See id. (“For children with intellectual or physical disabilities, nearly all therapies and services are received through schools. These vital services are difficult to provide through distance
learning models. As a result, more children with disabilities have received few to no services while
schools have been closed.”).
5
See id.
6
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82.
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right of students with disabilities to obtain a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE).7 Congress first guaranteed access to public education for children with certain disabilities through the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975.8 Today, that Act is known as the
IDEA.9 Finding that “[d]isability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in
or contribute to society,” Congress designed the IDEA to address nationwide failures to provide appropriate educational services to millions
of children with disabilities across the country.10
One procedural safeguard the IDEA provides students with is the
so-called “stay-put provision” found in § 1415(j) of the Act.11 This provision safeguards the student’s right to remain in her “then-current educational placement” during the pendency of administrative and court
proceedings related to alleged IDEA violations.12 But courts have split
on whether the stay-put provision applies if the student’s “then-current
educational placement” becomes unavailable.13 While some courts hold
that under such circumstances, the educational agency is required to
provide a comparable alternative educational placement,14 others hold
that no such affirmative obligation exists under the stay-put provision.15 Under the latter approach, once a student’s then-current placement is no longer functionally available, the object of the stay-put order
is considered to no longer exist, and any alternative placement would
be considered a change in the status-quo.16
This circuit split is more than a dispute over interpretation of the
IDEA’s provisions. Its resolution could either help or hamper students
with disabilities at a time when stability is most crucial to them. The
uncertainty inherent in the context of a novel pandemic only heightens
this need for stability. To resolve the circuit split on the stay-put provision, courts must acknowledge the purposes underlying the IDEA. Oth-

7

See generally id.
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended throughout 20 U.S.C. §§ 1405–20).
9
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82.
10
Id. § 1400(c)(1).
11
See id. at § 1415(j).
12
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (“Except as provided in § 300.533,
during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint notice requesting a due process hearing under § 300.507, unless the State or local agency
and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the complaint must remain in
his or her current educational placement.”).
13
Compare Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 335 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2003)
with Knight by Knight v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1025, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
14
See, e.g., Knight, 877 F.2d at 1028.
15
See, e.g., Wagner, 335 F.3d at 301.
16
See id. at 301–02.
8

447]

THE IDEA’S STAY-PUT PROVISION

443

erwise, challenging or unprecedented circumstances would give educational authorities a ready-made excuse to deprive students of the services they are entitled to.
This Comment will explain the relevance of the stay-put provision
in the pandemic context, with particular emphasis on addressing claims
that the pandemic has rendered a student’s then-current educational
placement unavailable. Part II discusses the IDEA, its status during
the COVID-19 pandemic, and its stay-put provision. Part III explains
the rationales underlying courts’ diverging interpretations of stay-put
in contexts where an educational placement becomes unavailable. To
resolve the circuit split, Part IV argues in favor of an affirmative-obligation approach. This approach not only provides students with muchneeded stability but also provides educational agencies with the flexibility they require as they adjust their policies and practices to the realities of a global pandemic.
II. THE IDEA AND ITS STAY-PUT PROVISION
This Part discusses the IDEA, including its substantive and procedural provisions. It details the Supreme Court’s FAPE jurisprudence,
then explains the IDEA’s dispute resolution procedures, including its
“stay-put” provision, which could prove particularly valuable to students and schools alike during a pandemic. It concludes by reviewing
the Department of Education’s (DOE) guidance on the Act’s status
within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The IDEA provides federal funds to states that agree to ensure children with qualifying disabilities have access to a free appropriate public
education (FAPE).17 To that end, schools must provide each child with
a disability a written statement that includes: the child’s current levels
of academic achievement and performance; measurable academic and
functional goals for the year; a description of how progress will be measured; and a description of the special education and related services
with which the child will be provided.18 This written statement is the
student’s “individualized education program” (IEP).19 It is prepared by
the child’s “IEP team,” comprised of the child’s parents, teachers, and
at least one local school official.20 The educational services provided are

17
18
19
20

See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
See id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
Id.
Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(v).
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intended to allow the student to make appropriate progress toward attaining their IEP’s annual goals.21
The IDEA also demands that a student’s FAPE be executed in what
the Act calls the “least restrictive environment.”22 This means that, “[t]o
the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are [to
be] educated with children who are not disabled.”23 Only if the child’s
disability is of such nature or severity that participation in regular classes “cannot be achieved satisfactorily” should the student be removed
from the general educational environment and placed in special classes
or separate schooling.24 The least restrictive environment requirement
reflects the IDEA’s presumption that, for most students, a FAPE involves placement in general education classrooms and grade-level advancement.25
1.

Free appropriate public education

While the Act delineates the precise content requirements for IEPs,
it does not offer much specificity regarding what constitutes a FAPE.26
Instead, the precise understanding of an adequate FAPE has been left
to the courts. The Supreme Court first took up the issue of defining “free
appropriate public education” in Board of Education of the Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley.27 In Rowley, the Court rejected the notion that the IDEA requires schools to provide educational
services necessary to maximize the potential of the handicapped child
in a way “commensurate with the opportunity provided other [nonhandicapped] children.”28 The Court instead held the Act’s FAPE guarantee
implicitly required “that the education . . . provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”29 Under this
holding, then, services provided to students with disabilities need not
offer potential-maximizing opportunities equal to those offered to students without disabilities. Instead, the Act guarantees only that the

21

See id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
See id. at § 1412(a)(5).
23
Id. at § 1412(a)(5)(A).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017) (citing Bd.
of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
26
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (describing the free and public education as tailored to the
child’s unique needs and designed to “prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living”); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189 (“Noticeably absent from the language of the
statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped
children.”).
27
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 200.
22
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school provides an education that offers the child some educational benefit.
States thus satisfy FAPE requirements when they (1) “compl[y]
with the procedures set forth in the Act” and (2) provide an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits”
from their personalized instruction and support services.30 In short,
FAPE requirements would only be violated in cases of IDEA procedural
violations or if the IEP was not adequately designed to provide the student with some educational benefit. Acknowledging the wide spectrum
of disabilities that the Act embraces—and thus the wide spectrum of
obtainable benefits for children with disabilities—the Rowley Court
made clear it was not establishing “any one test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by
the Act.”31
Over three decades later, the Court took up the issue of defining
that test with its decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1.32 In Endrew F., the Court held that the IDEA imposes a substantive obligation on schools to offer IEPs “reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”33 Reasoning that an IEP entails a “prospective judgment
by school officials,” informed by both their expertise and the input of
the child’s parents, the Court found that the appropriate question is not
whether a court deems the IEP at issue ideal, but rather whether that
IEP is reasonable.34 Thus, an IEP need not maximize the student’s academic potential. Rather, it is sufficient if it is reasonably designed,
based on the child’s circumstances, to enable her academic progress.
The Court indeed emphasized the IDEA’s “focus on the particular
child” and her progress.35 What that progress looks like, the Court
noted, will depend on the child’s circumstances.36 In cases where the
student with disabilities receives her education in a regular classroom—the Act’s preference whenever possible37—the child’s progress is
30

Id. at 203, 206–07 (“If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.”).
31
Id. at 202.
32
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
33
Id. at 999.
34
Id.
35
Id. (“A substantive standard not focused on student progress would do little to remedy the
pervasive and tragic academic stagnation that prompted Congress to act.”).
36
See id.
37
See 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are [to be] educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
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measurable via regular examinations, grades, and advancement from
grade to grade.38 For most students, a FAPE involves such integration
into the general education curriculum and classrooms.39 This was indeed the case for the plaintiff in Rowley, giving the Court “no need to
provide concrete guidance with respect to a child who is not fully integrated in the regular classroom and not able to achieve on grade level.”40
Endrew F. presented an opportunity for the Court to offer guidance
for those cases in which general-curriculum, grade-level advancement
is not a reasonable prospect for the student. Without elaborating thoroughly upon what appropriate progress will look like in any particular
case, the Court concluded that a student’s IEP “must be appropriately
ambitious in light of his circumstances,” such that the child has the opportunity “to meet challenging objectives.”41 The Court made clear that,
despite its decision not to hand down a bright-line rule,42 the substantive standard it established “is markedly more demanding than the
‘merely more than de minimis’ test” the Tenth Circuit had applied below.43
Endrew F.’s rejection of a “merely more than de minimis” standard
signaled a departure from the language in Rowley, which suggested
only “some educational benefit” was required.44 The Court warned, however, that the standard it established was not to be mistaken for “an
invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.”45 In
this, the Court recognized that IEP’s are prospective in nature and are
informed by the expertise of school officials and the input of parents.46
As such, courts are not to import their retrospective judgments about
an IEP’s adequacy. Instead, given educational authorities’ expertise,
courts must exercise deference in assessing an IEP’s adequacy and the
progress it is calculated to achieve.47
38

See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
See id. at 1000.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See id. at 1001 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 206 (1982)) (“We will not attempt to elaborate on what ‘appropriate’ progress will look
like from case to case . . . . This absence of a bright-line rule, however, should not be mistaken for
‘an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of
the school authorities which they review.’”).
43
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000–01 (“[A] student offered an educational program providing
‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been offered
an education at all.”).
44
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
45
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).
46
Id. at 999.
47
See id. at 1001–02.
39
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IEP dispute resolution

Given the collaborative and fact-intensive nature of an IEP’s formulation, education providers and parents sometimes disagree on an
IEP’s contents. As such, the IDEA sets forth dispute resolution procedures for parents seeking to challenge “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free and public education to such child.”48 Parents and
relevant members of the IEP team may opt to resolve the disagreement
via mediation.49 They may also have an opportunity for an “impartial
due process hearing” before either the state or the local educational
agency, as determined by the state educational agency or by state law.50
The opportunity for this due process hearing arises only if the parties
fail to reach an agreement and settle the dispute through what the Act
calls a “preliminary meeting” with the local educational agency.51
If these steps fail to produce an agreement between the parties, the
aggrieved party may bring a civil action in state or federal district
court.52 If a student’s IEP is found to be inadequate, parents may be
entitled to injunctive relief, compensatory educational services, or reimbursement for expenses, like private school tuition.53 Courts have
broad discretion in fashioning such remedies where IDEA violations are
found.54
3.

The “stay-put” provision

During the pendency of administrative and court proceedings, a
student is entitled to remain in her “then-current educational place-

48

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A).
See id. at § 1415(e).
50
Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(A).
51
Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)–(iii); see also id. at § 1415(g) (“If the hearing required by subsection
(f) is conducted by a local educational agency, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational
agency.”).
52
See id. at § 1415(i)(2)(A) (noting that the action may be brought “without regard to the
amount in controversy”).
53
See Michael Stein & Michael Waterstone, Finding the Gaps: A Comparative Analysis of
Disability Laws in the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, NAT’L. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (May 12, 2008), https://ncd.gov/publications/2008
/May122008 [https://perma.cc/Q8MG-Q6PP]; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (“In any action
brought under this paragraph, the court . . . shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”).
54
See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993) (quoting Sch. Comm. of
Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 374 (1985)) (“Under [the IDEA],
‘equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief,’ . . . and the court enjoys ‘broad discretion’ in so doing.”).
49
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ment” unless her parents and the educational agency reach an alternative agreement.55 This procedural safeguard is commonly referred to as
the “stay-put” provision.56 Congress enacted the provision to prevent
school authorities from unilaterally excluding students with disabilities
from school, breaking the educational status quo, or taking retaliatory
actions in response to complaints.57 While its historical impetus revolved largely around the removal of students demonstrating disruptive
behaviors,58 this safeguard is worded and has been construed broadly,
extending beyond cases of disruptive student conduct. Indeed, courts
issue stay-put orders in order to maintain the educational status quo
throughout the course of IEP dispute proceedings.59 The provision is intended to preserve, to the extent possible, the student’s then-current
placement and to prevent the impairment of their learning experience.
Complicating that goal is the fact that the IDEA fails to define the
term “then-current educational placement.” The term is generally understood, for purposes of the stay-put provision, as the placement described in the student’s last agreed upon IEP.60 Rather than denoting a
particular site or service provider, however, “a child’s educational placement ‘falls somewhere between the physical school attended by a child
and the abstract goals of a child’s IEP.’”61 Successful invocation of the
stay-put provision effectively serves as an automatic preliminary injunction.62 Accordingly, the party invoking the stay-put provision need
not show factors typically required for injunctive relief, like irreparable

55

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a).
See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308 (1988).
57
See id.; M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2014); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v.
M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2012).
58
See Honig, 484 U.S. at 323.
59
See id. at 323–28 (describing the stay-put provision as an “unequivocal” mandate that “effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child’s current educational placement”); see also J.O.
ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2002); T.M. ex rel. A.M. v.
Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that the purpose of the stayput provision is “to maintain the educational status quo while the parties’ dispute is being resolved”).
60
See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 2d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2012). For variations on this interpretation, see, for example, Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 452
(2d Cir. 2015) (“To determine a child’s ‘then-current educational placement,’ a court typically looks
to: (1) ‘the placement described in the child’s most recently implemented IEP’; (2) ‘the operative
placement actually functioning at the time when the stay put provision of the IDEA was invoked’;
or (3) ‘the placement at the time of the previously implemented IEP.’” (quoting Mackey ex rel.
Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2004))).
61
Johnson, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218,
Cook Cnty., Ill. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also White ex rel.
White v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 2003) (agreeing that “placement”
means a setting rather than a particular school).
62
See, e.g., Casey K. ex rel. Norman K. v. St. Anne Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 302, 400 F.3d
508, 511 (7th Cir. 2005); Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996).
56
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harm or likelihood of success on the merits.63 Instead, the inquiry into
whether the provision was violated focuses on whether the action taken
constitutes a change in the student’s current educational placement.64
Such a change occurs “when a fundamental change in, or elimination
of, a basic element of the educational program has occurred.”65
The question of whether an action constitutes a fundamental
change in the child’s placement—and thus whether stay-put is triggered—is a highly fact-specific inquiry.66 Courts have found that movement to substantively or materially identical school settings does not
constitute a fundamental change.67 Instead, fundamental changes are
those modifications “likely to affect in some significant way the child’s
learning experience.”68 For example, one court found the combination of
reduced special education services and alterations to a student’s lunch
and between-classroom transitions entitled her to a stay-put injunction.69 Because the alterations constituted a fundamental change in the
structure and quality of the student’s educational placement, the stayput provision was triggered.70
B. The IDEA in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic
In March of 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act).71 The CARES Act required the
Secretary of Education to recommend which IDEA provisions, if any,
should be waived by Congress given the exigencies of the COVID-19
pandemic. Such waivers would aim to provide educational agencies
with limited flexibility to meet the IDEA’s statutory and administrative
requirements during the pandemic.72 On April 27, 2020, then-Secretary
Betsy DeVos submitted a report recommending limited waivers that
would allow for extensions of certain evaluation timelines as well as

63

Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Zvi D.
by Shirley D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The statute substitutes an absolute
rule in favor of the status quo for the court’s discretionary consideration of the factors . . . .”).
64
See, e.g., Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 645 (6th Cir. 1999);
G.B. v. District of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 109, 114–17 (D.D.C. 2015).
65
Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 199 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 1999).
66
See DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1984).
67
See, e.g., D.K. v. District of Columbia, 983 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.D.C. 2013); Bd. of Educ.
of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County, Ill. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 549 (7th
Cir. 1996); AW ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2004).
68
DeLeon, 747 F.2d at 153 (“It is clear that the ‘stay put’ provision does not entitle parents to
the right to demand a hearing before a minor decision alters the school day of their children.”).
69
G.B., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 114–17.
70
Id. at 117.
71
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020).
72
Id. at § 3511(a), (d)(4).
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some flexibility in spending funds allocated by the Act.73 Secretary
DeVos recommended no waivers, however, “for any of the core tenets of
the IDEA . . . most notably a free appropriate public education [ ] in the
least restrictive environment.”74 The DOE reasoned that individual students’ interests and needs should be prioritized over the systems’ and
that innovative approaches are required in place of formerly in-person
services.75
Secretary DeVos’s recommendations were not met with unanimous
agreement. While disability advocates commended the decision not to
waive core provisions of the IDEA, some education officials pushed for
protection from IDEA liability, citing the logistical and physical challenges posed by COVID-19 to serving special education students.76 Most
recently, the DOE’s Office of Special Education Programs offered more
guidance on the IDEA’s provision of educational services during
COVID-19.77 The guidance reminded educators, parents, and administrators to consider various options for delivering specialized instruction
and related services to students with disabilities.78 It emphasized that,
regardless of the form of instructional delivery, state and local educational agencies and IEP teams “remain responsible for ensuring that a
[FAPE] is provided to all children with disabilities.”79 Furthermore, if
local or state decisions limit or prohibit opportunities for in-person instruction because of health or safety concerns, these parties “are not
relieved of their obligation to provide a FAPE to each child with a disability under IDEA.”80
Some were concerned that Secretary DeVos’s report could lead to a
flood of complaints and legal action from parents challenging their
child’s special education services.81 While suits have been filed in several states, including class actions in Hawaii and Pennsylvania,82 there
73

BETSY DEVOS, RECOMMENDED WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 3511(D)(4) OF DIVISION
A OF THE CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT (“CARES ACT”) 11–12 (Apr. 27,
2020),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/coronavirus/cares-waiver-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HNW3-WF4A].
74
Id. at 11.
75
Id.
76
See Corey Mitchell, Schools Seek Cover From Special Education Lawsuits, But Advocates
See Another Motive, EDUC. WEEK (July 29, 2020), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2020/07
/schools_seeks_cover_from_special_education_lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/W6MP-HSMX].
77
See OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OSEP QA 20-01 (Sept.
28,
2020),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-provision-of-services-idea-part-b-09-28-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF4M-7WPU].
78
Id. at 1–2.
79
Id. at 2.
80
Id. (also noting that “school staff and parents are encouraged to work together to find ways
to meet the needs of children with disabilities, notwithstanding the COVID-19 challenges”).
81
See Mitchell, supra note 76.
82
See Suevon Lee, Lawsuit: Special Ed Students Need Extra Help When Schools Reopen,
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has yet to be a major surge in COVID-related FAPE litigation. IDEArelated litigation may also experience an increase in challenges to students’ proposed IEPs, especially as many schools continue to function
remotely or in hybrid formats. As these IEP disputes arise and administrative or judicial proceedings take place, parties may invoke the
IDEA’s stay-put provision. As such, there is a pressing need to clarify
the implications of stay-put in the context of a global pandemic.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Comment addresses how the IDEA’s stay-put provision functions when the last agreed-upon placement is no longer available—a
circumstance particularly relevant in the pandemic context. Some
courts hold that the stay-put provision requires that educational authorities arrange for similar or equivalent educational placements
when a student’s then-current placement becomes unavailable. Other
courts maintain that the provision imposes no such affirmative obligation on school authorities. Representative of this circuit split are cases
out of the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit.
A. The Stay-Put Provision as Imposing an Affirmative Obligation
The D.C. Circuit has held that when a student’s then-current educational placement is no longer available, the educational agency is obligated under the stay-put provision to provide the student with a similar placement during the pendency of administrative and judicial
proceedings.83 Underlying this interpretation of the stay-put provision
is the understanding that a student’s then-current placement need not
be tied to a physical school or service provider.84 Instead, it encompasses
the services and abstract goals included in the student’s IEP.85 Thus, a
then-current placement’s unavailability simply means the relevant
school authorities are required to locate and provide an alternative
placement similar to the one no longer available.
Under this understanding of “then-current placement,” a parent
seeking a stay-put order needs to demonstrate a change in educational
placement by identifying some fundamental change in, or elimination
HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.civilbeat.org/2020/04/lawsuit-special-ed-students-should-get-extra-help-when-schools-reopen/ [https://perma.cc/WX5A-XPXF]; Avi WolfmanArent, Lawsuit Says Pa. is Failing Special Needs Kids During Coronavirus School Closures,
CHALKBEAT PHILA. (May 19, 2020), https://philadelphia.chalkbeat.org/2020/5/19/22186707/lawsuit-says-pa-is-failing-special-needs-kids-during-coronavirus-school-closures
[https://perma.cc/E86C-8FJW].
83
See Knight by Knight v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1025, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
84
See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 2d 173, 177 (D.D.C. 2012).
85
See id. at 179.
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of, an aspect of the child’s educational program.86 Following such a
showing, the parent is entitled to stay-put relief compelling the educational authority to provide an interim placement, comparable to the
then-current placement, if the then-current placement becomes unavailable.87
B. The Stay-Put Provision as Solely Prohibitory
The Fourth Circuit, in Wagner v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,88 held that the IDEA’s stay-put provision imposes no affirmative obligation on school authorities to establish alternatives for students whose then-current educational placement becomes functionally
unavailable.89 The court classified the stay-put provision as “totally prohibitory in nature.”90 Noting that the provision contains no exception
for cases in which the then-current educational placement becomes unavailable, the court concluded that only the student’s then-current
placement—whether available or not—may serve as the object of a stayput order.91 The court further reasoned that an order for alternative
placement would remove the student from their then-current placement, an outcome which would turn the provision “on its head by transforming a tool for preserving the status quo into an implement for
change.”92
The Fourth Circuit supported this interpretation by pointing to
§ 1415(k), which addresses interim alternative placements for students
involved in disruptive behavior or code-of-conduct violations.93 In such
cases, the provision expressly grants hearing officers the authority to
place a student in an “appropriate interim alternative educational setting” if the officer finds the student’s current placement is substantially
likely to pose a risk of injury to the student or to others.94 The court
reasoned that, given that Congress expressly authorizes alternative educational placements in this part of the IDEA, it is telling that the stayput provision does not expressly vest courts with the authority to order

86

See Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1582 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See Knight, 877 F.2d at 1029; see also Laster v. District of Columbia, 394 F. Supp. 2d 60,
64–66 (D.D.C. 2005).
88
335 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2003).
89
See id. at 301.
90
Id.
91
See id.
92
Id. at 302.
93
See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).
94
Wagner, 335 F.3d at 302; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(i)(2)(C)(iii).
87
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alternate educational placements within the context of the stay-put provision.95 In short, the Wagner court argued, if Congress intended to vest
courts with the authority to order alternative interim placements, it
knew how to and could have done so.96 In the stay-put context, the court
concluded, Congress decided not to.97
The court further explained that stay-put’s inapplicability in these
circumstances does not leave parties without remedy.98 Parties seeking
alternatives to a then-current placement that is no longer available may
simply agree on a new placement with the educational agency.99 They
may also move for a preliminary injunction under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) of
the IDEA, which allows a court to “grant such relief as [it] determines
is appropriate.”100 The court would then have the equitable power to
order a change in placement if it considers such an order appropriate
under the circumstances.101 The primary difference between such a preliminary injunction and the stay-put injunction is that the former would
not be automatic, and the party seeking the injunction would bear the
burden of demonstrating entitlement to injunctive relief under the
standards typically governing preliminary injunctions.102
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the availability of the non-automatic, higher-burden preliminary injunction is “consistent with the presumption created by Congress that a child should remain in the thencurrent educational placement.”103 The court also considered this conclusion consistent with the reality that, in some instances, keeping a
student in her then-current placement could cause irreparable harm.104
Finally, the court warned that district courts should exercise extreme
caution when considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction to
change a student’s educational placement, “given the statute’s strong
presumption, expressed in [the stay-put provision], in favor of the status quo.”105

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Wagner, 335 F.3d at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
Wagner, 335 F.3d at 302.
Id.
Id. (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988)).
Wagner, 335 F.3d at 302.
Id. at 303.
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C. Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the COVID-19 Special Education
Context
Recent cases offer little to illustrate what the preliminary injunction balancing the Fourth Circuit describes might look like in the
COVID-19 context. But one recent decision out of the District of New
Mexico provides an example. In Hernandez v. Grisham,106 the plaintiffs—including Woodworth, the parent of a child with special needs—
sought injunctive relief to prohibit the defendants from preventing inperson instruction.107 Woodworth alleged that COVID-related school
closures interrupted her daughter’s IEP services, such that she had regressed and was failing her remote courses.108 While the plaintiffs argued Woodworth’s daughter’s protections under the IDEA were “profoundly affected by being denied in-person education[,]”109 defendants
argued that, under DOE guidance, “there must be some flexibility as to
students’ FAPE due to the exceptional and ever-changing environment
of the pandemic.”110
The court addressed whether Woodworth was entitled to a temporary restraining order.111 It concluded that the “severe learning loss”
Woodworth’s daughter experienced because of her school’s closure constituted “an irreparable harm under the IDEA, which requires schools
provide a FAPE which ‘enable[s]’ a child to ‘progress.’”112 This threatened irreparable harm, the court further held, outweighed possible
harm to the defendants.113 Addressing whether the temporary restraining order would be against the public interest, the court concluded that,
because of children’s lower risk of spreading and contracting COVID19—and the fact that the court was not ordering a full reopening of
schools—the educational agency was obligated, even during the pandemic, to provide FAPE to students with disabilities.114
Finally, the court concluded that Woodworth’s IDEA claim was
likely to succeed on the merits.115 Comparing Woodworth’s daughter’s
outcomes with those of the student in Rowley, the court concluded it
106

494 F. Supp. 3d 1044 (D.N.M. 2020).
See id. at 1059, 1083.
108
See id. at 1059.
109
Id. at 1084.
110
Id. at 1089.
111
Id. at 1148–50; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
112
Hernandez, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 1148–49 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017)).
113
Id. at 1149 (“It will not damage Woodworth’s LEA to correctly apply the Reentry Guidance,
as well as the Endrew F. standards.”).
114
See id. at 1149 (“[I]n spite of the ongoing pandemic, Secretary Stewart must provide Woodworth’s daughter with a ‘free and appropriate public education’ as the IDEA requires.”).
115
Id. at 1150.
107
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was unlikely her IEP was “reasonably calculated to ensure she received
educational benefits.”116 Unlike the plaintiff in Rowley, Woodworth’s
daughter was not making progress, did not have access to substantial
specialized instruction or services, and was denied in-person services
because her IEP misinterpreted the state’s health regulations.117 Because remote instruction prevented her daughter from making progress, the court concluded that Woodworth could likely demonstrate her
daughter was not receiving a FAPE, in violation of the IDEA.118
IV. THE STAY-PUT PROVISION AS A SOURCE OF BOTH STABILITY
AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE PANDEMIC CONTEXT
In resolving the split among circuits regarding the stay-put provision, courts should interpret “then-current placement” not as a physical
space, but rather as the educational program, services, and goals of the
last agreed-upon IEP. To that end, other courts should adopt the stayput interpretation of the D.C. Circuit, imposing an affirmative obligation on school authorities to provide comparable interim placements for
students whose then-current placement becomes unavailable. Such an
interpretation accords with the Act’s purposes as well as the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Act. Moreover, this approach addresses
both the urgent need for stability that students face during IEP disputes and the flexibility that school authorities seek in the pandemic
context.
A. “Then-Current Educational Placement” Should Be Construed
Broadly
While courts seem to agree that “then-current educational placement” does not necessarily denote a particular school or classroom,119
the Fourth Circuit’s approach to stay-put fails to recognize the inherent—and useful—flexibility in the term. Parties seeking enforcement of
the stay-put provision would benefit from courts’ affirmation of a broad
116

Id. (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 995–96).
Id.
118
Hernandez, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
119
See, e.g., Spilsbury v. District of Columbia, 307 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he
IDEA clearly intends ‘current educational placement’ to encompass the whole range of services
that a child needs; the term ‘current educational placement’ cannot be read to only indicate which
physical school building a child attends.”); AW ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d
674, 683 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that educational placement “fixes the overall instructional
setting in which the student receives his education, rather than the precise location of that setting”); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County, Ill. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ.,
103 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We accept as the outer parameters of ‘educational placement’
that it means something more than the actual school attended by the child.”); Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 199 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation).
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construction of the term. Indeed, the IDEA’s codified purpose of providing tailored services to students with disabilities120 supports a comprehensive understanding of the term “educational placement.” This conception of the student’s placement—including related developmental,
supportive, and corrective services—best accords with the fact that
IEPs stipulate not only particular services but also a student’s functional goals for academic performance and achievement.121
In the pandemic context in particular, this construction provides
both stability for students with disabilities and flexibility for educational agencies altering their practices during ever-changing and uncertain times. Pandemics like COVID-19 may force closures of particular schools or cancellation of particular activities. But construing
educational placement more abstractly to encompass special education
and related services will require school authorities to provide the student with comparable services—even if this means providing them outside the student’s typical school setting. In short, even if a pandemic
puts a student at risk of exclusion from a physical classroom, the school
would be responsible for maintaining the essence of the educational and
related services described in the student’s IEP.
This is not to say that a broad construction of “educational placement” leaves educational agencies worse-off. Indeed, inherent in this
broad construction is the flexibility school authorities seek in the everevolving pandemic context. For example, should a particular school
seek to make various minor alterations in a program as necessary during pandemic-caused school closures, the educational agency would not
need to worry that every change it makes would constitute a change in
placement.122 Only changes fairly categorized as “fundamental” would
trigger stay-put.123 The same could be true for those educational agencies wishing to adopt innovative measures that would amount to materially equivalent placements.124
To understand what an order under this stability-meets-flexibility
solution might look like, a New York case offers one example. In L.V. on
behalf of J.V.2 v. New York City Department of Education,125 the school
120

See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
See id. at § 1414(d).
122
See, e.g., Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X (PS 79) v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that such a construction would
not apply to “all the various adjustments in [an educational] program that the educational agency,
in the traditional exercise of its discretion, may determine to be necessary”).
123
See Part II.A, supra, for a discussion of the fact-specific inquiry involved in determining
whether a change in placement is “fundamental.”
124
See, e.g., Concerned Parents & Citizens, 629 F.2d at 755 (describing a narrower interpretation as tending to discourage school authorities from “introducing new activities or programs or
from accepting privately sponsored programs”).
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No. 19-CV-05451, 2020 WL 4043529 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020), report and recommendation
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district failed to provide the plaintiff’s son with consistent educational
services.126 Following the onset of the pandemic, her son struggled to
effectively engage in remote learning, and the internet connection on
his school-issued tablet device was unreliable.127 Because her son
needed physical, occupational, and speech therapies—all of which were
particularly difficult to obtain given the student’s small living space and
unreliable Wi-Fi—the plaintiff located private providers who would be
willing to provide her son with in-person services.128
The court noted that the New York City Department of Education
failed to adequately explain how providing computer-based services
could be a satisfactory substitute for a student whose placement “contemplated delivery of in-person services.”129 The court thus ordered the
plaintiff to provide the names of service providers she had located who
were willing to provide her son with in-person services, notwithstanding the pandemic. The educational agency was to utilize those providers
or locate others itself.130 Finally, the court ordered the agency to “conduct an . . . evaluation to assess [the student’s] individual needs and the
software required to deliver his required services, remotely, to the extent certain services cannot be provided in-person due to the current
pandemic.”131
The order offered both stability to the student and flexibility to the
educational agency. By mandating that the plaintiff provide the New
York City Department of Education with the names of the providers she
had located, the court facilitated cooperation between the parties. In
this, the court allowed for the provision of crucial services without
which the plaintiff’s son was struggling to make progress. This muchneeded stability for the student was paired with flexibility for the school
agency. While the agency was ordered to utilize the providers found by
the plaintiff, it was also allowed to locate its own. Additionally, where
the school district deemed provision of in-person services unfeasible due
to the pandemic, it was allowed to provide the required services remotely. This accommodation, however, required that the agency evaluate the child’s technological circumstances to ensure that, where in-person services were not possible, provision of remote services could
adequately be delivered.

adopted, No. 19 Civ. 5451, 2020 WL 4040958 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020).
126
Id. at *2.
127
Id.
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Id.
129
Id. at *5.
130
See id.
131
Id.
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B. Problems with the Fourth Circuit’s No-Affirmative-Obligation Approach
The Fourth Circuit’s no-affirmative-obligation approach is problematic because it rests on a faulty comparison:132 requiring schools to
provide equivalent services when a then-current placement becomes
unavailable does not “transform[ ] a tool for preserving the status quo
into an implement for change.”133 Quite the opposite. A parent seeking
services equivalent to those of a now-unavailable then-current placement is merely seeking the maintenance of the educational placement
and services the school authorities last agreed to provide.
A comparable alternative placement will, by definition, entail different service providers or physical placement. But even the Fourth Circuit has recognized that a student’s placement is a setting rather than
a particular physical location.134 Indeed, the court concluded in AW ex
rel. Wilson v. Fairfax County School Board135 that a student’s “‘educational placement’ fixes the overall instructional setting in which the student receives his education, rather than the precise location of that setting.”136 In that case, the court applied this setting-not-location
approach to conclude that the student’s transfer to another physical location did not implicate the stay-put provision, as the court found that
the new physical location was a “materially identical setting.”137
This is a far cry from the placement changes many students with
disabilities experienced because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Future
pandemics could similarly displace students from their physical educational placements, but this need not mean they will be deprived of the
placement defined in their IEP—even under the Fourth Circuit’s understanding of “educational placement.”
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to stay-put, then, prematurely resolves the question of whether an affirmative obligation on school districts exists. The court concludes that only the student’s then-current
placement—whether available or not—may serve as the object of a stayput order.138 Even accepting this as true, it does not follow that school
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See, e.g., Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id.
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See AW ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing
White ex rel. White v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing the
“better view” as the position that placement “means a setting (such as regular classes, special
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rather than “a particular school”)).
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authorities have no obligation under stay-put to provide a similar placement if the last-agreed upon placement becomes unavailable during the
pendency of dispute proceedings.
Put simply, if a student’s then-current placement is available, and
stay-put applies, that placement would be the object of the stay-put order. If a student’s then-current placement is no longer available, that
then-current placement would still serve as the object of stay-put. The
only difference is that, in the latter situation, the educational authority
would be required to ensure the student has a comparable or equivalent
educational placement at which she can “stay put” during the pendency
of administrative and judicial proceedings.
Ordering a similar interim placement in this context does not, as
the Fourth Circuit contends, “effect a change in placement”139 in the
sense that the stay-put provision aims to prevent. For one, parents in
this situation are not attempting to secure a new placement over an
already existing one. Nor are they trying to obtain more services than
stipulated in the last agreed-upon IEP. Rather, they are seeking restoration, in the form of a comparable placement, of the resources and services stipulated in the last agreed-upon IEP. This is not the unilateral
change in placement stay-put seeks to avoid.
Indeed, a school’s failure to provide a similar pendency placement
is far more akin to such undesirable, unilateral change. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the stay-put provision is intended to “strip
schools of the unilateral authority they . . . traditionally employed to exclude disabled students . . . from school.”140 The Fourth Circuit’s approach directly conflicts with this purpose by concluding that, once a
then-current placement becomes unavailable, educational agencies are
not affirmatively obligated to provide an equivalent placement.
This is not to suggest school authorities unabashedly act in bad
faith toward special education students but rather to draw attention to
the fact that the “no affirmative obligation” approach can effectively
amount to exclusion from school—especially in the pandemic context of
widespread school closures. This is precisely the outcome the IDEA
seeks to prevent.141 A then-current placement’s unavailability, thus,
must trigger a requirement that educational authorities provide comparable services to the student invoking stay-put so as to not exclude
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See id.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988); see also Spilsbury v. District of Columbia, 307 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2004) (“To comply with the IDEA, [the educational agency] must ensure
that the students retain both their current placements and their current level of services while the
proposed change is litigated.”).
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her from the special education she is entitled to. This is especially imperative because parents of special needs students may lack the resources or expertise to secure an appropriate alternative placement for
their child.
To the extent the Fourth Circuit relies on the language of § 1415(k)
to support its no-affirmative-obligation approach,142 § 1415(j)’s silence
on the issue of ordering alternative educational placement should not
be dispositive. The court in Wagner noted that § 1415(k)—which concerns students engaging in code-of-conduct violations or other disruptive behavior—expressly grants hearing officers the authority to place
a student in an alternative educational placement.143 The lack of a similar authorization in § 1415(j), the Fourth Circuit reasoned, meant that
courts should not order alternative educational placements via a stayput order.144
The court disregards, however, another aspect of the IDEA on
which the statute is silent: the definition of the term “then-current
placement.” Nonetheless, the court construes that term exceedingly
narrowly. It concludes that only a then-current placement can serve as
the object of a stay-put order.145 When that placement becomes unavailable, the educational authority is under no obligation to provide an alternative because, it contends, such an alternative would constitute a
change in placement.146 The court follows this by emphasizing the stayput provision’s “strong presumption . . . in favor of the status quo.”147
In the context of a now-unavailable placement, however, a reading
more in line with that presumption would require schools to supply an
alternative placement. This is because ordering the provision of alternative services or placements undoubtedly leaves the child closer to the
“status quo” than allowing the student to go without such provisions
would. If “Location A” and “Service X” from an IEP are rendered unavailable because of the circumstances of the pandemic, it is clear that
offering the student a comparable “Location B” and “Service Y”—
whether identified by the school alone, or with the help of parents—
leaves the student closer to the status quo than would depriving her of
locations or services altogether.
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See Wagner, 335 F.3d at 301.
See id. at 302; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).
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Id. at 301.
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Indeed, deference to school authorities in the IDEA context would
justify courts’ enforcement of an affirmative obligation to provide equivalent or comparable services.148 When educational agencies agree to a
student’s IEP, they do not merely agree to particular locations or service
providers. They also set measurable goals, “including academic and
functional goals” for the year.149 Progress toward these goals is precisely
what the IDEA is intended to provide.150 A no-affirmative-obligation approach unnecessarily halts that progress in cases where a student’s
placement becomes unavailable. Furthermore, it allows educational
agencies to escape their obligation to provide the student with the educational placement they last approved and agreed to offer. It should follow from deference to the educational authority’s judgments that the
student is entitled to those services stipulated in her last IEP—even if
they must be secured through another provider or location. In other
words, deferring to school authorities’ expertise should lead courts to
order the provision of the placement those expert authorities last
deemed appropriate for the child.
Finally, the alternative remedies the Fourth Circuit offers are inadequate in the context of a now-unavailable educational placement.
The court first states that parties seeking alternatives to an unavailable then-current placement may “simply” agree on a new placement
with the educational agency.151 This underestimates the potential difficulty of reaching such agreements. By the time a court becomes involved in the IEP dispute, attempts at reconciliation, as well as other
administrative proceedings, have already taken place.152 The child’s
unique needs, paired with the educational agency’s often-limited resources, are alone enough to stifle attempts at agreement. The realities
of pandemic-induced shutdowns do nothing to facilitate such resolutions. In short, if reaching a compromise were so simple, the court would
not have the case before it in the first place.
The Fourth Circuit’s other proposed remedial measure—a preliminary injunction under § 1415(i)(2)(C), which the court calls a “safetyvalve”153—also fails to provide an adequate solution. Rather than re-
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quiring the court to simply consider whether the automatic stay-put injunction is applicable, the preliminary injunction requires a showing of
the typical factors, including irreparable harm and likelihood of success
on the merits, none of which are required to justify a stay-put order.154
This unnecessarily complicates and prolongs a parent’s efforts to simply
maintain their child’s educational status quo—only to reach the result
a stay-put order could have provided more efficiently. All this for an
order which would be temporary, lasting only during the pendency of
the dispute proceedings. Furthermore, it requires that courts engage in
the more delicate balancing inherent in granting preliminary injunctive
relief. This makes little sense in the special education context, where
courts are encouraged to exercise deference to academic experts. It is
also difficult to justify, given that parents are simply seeking to reinstate the IEP services last agreed-upon by both themselves and the educational agency.
C. The Affirmative-Obligation Interpretation of the Stay-Put is Optimal for Both Sides
For various reasons, the affirmative-obligation approach to stayput can provide a workable solution for both parents and educational
agencies during pandemic-related IEP disputes. To begin, the affirmative-obligation interpretation provides the student with disabilities
much-needed stability during the pendency of pandemic-caused IEP
dispute proceedings. The approach accords with stay-put’s remedial
purpose as a procedural safeguard intended to maintain the student’s
educational status quo.
Of course, comparable services provided in place of now-unavailable ones do not amount to perfect stability. But in the context of a pandemic that has caused widespread school closures and has rendered certain services unavailable, stability must mean something different.
Where the alternative is leaving the student without a comparable
placement—as a no-affirmative-obligation approach would—requiring
the educational agency to secure comparable placement is the best form
of stability available. It is as close to maintaining the status quo as is
feasible when an original placement becomes inaccessible. Courts have
long recognized how ponderous the review process can be under the
IDEA;155 and leaving students, in the interim, without the placement
they are entitled to contravenes the Act’s purpose of allowing students
with disabilities to make academic progress. The affirmative-obligation
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approach thus also prevents the exclusion of students with disabilities
from school, a primary historical impetus behind the enactment of the
IDEA and its stay-put provision.
The affirmative-obligation approach may also serve to encourage
compromises between parents and educational agencies with regard to
a student’s placement during administrative or judicial proceedings.
The stay-put provision contains an exception whereby, if the parents
and educational agency agree to an alternative placement, the latter is
not required to have the student remain in her then-current educational
placement.156 Thus, if an educational agency believes it will be unable
to maintain the student’s then-current placement—or considers it unfeasible or unsafe due to the pandemic—it will be incentivized to reach
an alternative agreement with the parents in order to avoid a stay-put
violation and IDEA liability. This, in turn, may benefit parents who
prefer to resolve disputes regarding their child’s educational placement
outside of the courtroom. It could also prove beneficial to those parents
unable to afford costly litigation efforts in which parents are already
less likely than schools to prevail.
D. Potential Critiques of the Affirmative-Obligation Approach
Some might argue that, in the context of an unavailable then-current placement, the automatic stay-put injunction places too low a burden on parents and too high a burden on school authorities. This is not
the case. Parents may not justify a stay-put motion by merely alleging
a minor change in services or setting.157 Indeed, they are required to
demonstrate a fundamental change in the educational placement, program, or services in order to trigger the stay-put provision.158 Meanwhile, under the affirmative-obligation approach to the stay-put provision, educational agencies are not being ordered to provide more
services by way of the order. They are merely ordered to provide those
services stipulated in the last agreed-upon IEP, even if this means securing alternative service providers.
The Department of Education’s guidelines and reports have consistently emphasized an intent not to compromise the core values of the
IDEA during the pandemic.159 The IDEA has—since its inception—been
considered an ambitious piece of legislation.160 An educational agency
156

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (“[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to
this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child
shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.”).
157
See, e.g., DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1984).
158
See id.
159
See DEVOS, supra note 73.
160
See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).

464

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2021

should not be permitted to reduce the quality or degree of the services
it provides to students legally entitled to them, especially during the
particularly daunting circumstances surrounding a global pandemic.
Another potential critique is that the very scale of a pandemic
causes problems that affected all students, disabled and non-disabled
alike. As such, the argument would proceed, school authorities cannot
be faulted for the fact that students with disabilities receive fewer services. After all, the same could be said to apply to students without disabilities. But this argument fails to address the ways in which pandemic-induced transitions to remote learning impact students with
disabilities more severely.161 Students entitled to an IEP under the
IDEA often require additional services related to their educational advancement, including classroom aides and various forms of therapy. As
such, the IEP’s elements, and their translation into practice, are integral to the child’s ability to learn.
At least one court has found that across-the-board decreases in educational services did not violate the IDEA’s purpose of protecting students with disabilities from being singled out and excluded. 162 But depriving or eliminating particular elements of an IEP—especially where
alternative placements or services can be found elsewhere—profoundly
impacts students with disabilities who are legally entitled to the services described in their IEP.163
Finally, some might argue that the IDEA demands more from parents and families—rather than educational authorities—during a pandemic. Such critics would likely note the Act’s emphasis on collaboration between educational agencies and parents, as well as its findings
regarding parents’ roles and their responsibility for ensuring their children “have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of
their children at school and at home.”164
Undoubtedly, the pandemic has demanded more from families and
parents with regard to their children’s education. An argument demanding greater efforts from families, however, ignores the unique,
161
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specialized training and expertise educational professionals possess—
which most parents lack, and which courts often defer to in resolving
IDEA disputes. This argument also ignores the disproportionately high
numbers of low-income, minority, or limited-English-proficient families
that are served by public special education. Language barriers pose rather obvious challenges for helping one’s children in an English-language-based curriculum, and low-income families may lack the capacity
to support their child’s academic success for other reasons. For example,
many low-income parents must work outside the home, even during a
pandemic, and are thus unable to facilitate at-home instruction. Others
are unlikely to have the financial means to provide their children with
the technology and internet access that facilitate remote instruction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant disruptions in
schooling across the nation. Widespread school closures have sparked
concerns about academic stagnation and regression. Particularly susceptible to these are students with disabilities, who rely heavily on the
educational placement and services provided to them pursuant to the
IDEA. Forced transitions to remote instruction left many special education students without the environments and tailored resources described in their IEPs. While there has yet to be a significant surge in
COVID-related IDEA litigation—likely explained by the often-ponderous nature of administrative and judicial proceedings—the IDEA’s
stay-put provision may prove highly relevant in the pandemic context.
The stay-put provision protects disabled students’ right to remain
in their then-current educational placement for the duration of IEP dispute proceedings. Because of the ever-evolving circumstances the pandemic entails, one circumstance likely to recur is that in which the
“then-current educational placement” becomes unavailable. Courts
have split in their application of the stay-put provision to these situations. Some hold that the educational agency in these cases is required
to provide a similar alternative placement in lieu of the now-unavailable placement. Others hold that the stay-put provision entails no such
affirmative obligation.
Because the no affirmative-obligation-approach in several ways
contravenes the IDEA’s purpose and text, including its stay-put provision, it is unsatisfactory. The availability of preliminary injunctive relief does not justify reliance on this approach, as such relief fails to address the urgency inherent in situations involving the stay-put
provision. Meanwhile, the affirmative-obligation interpretation may
benefit both parents and educational agencies involved in pandemic-
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related IEP disputes. It not only offers much-needed stability to students with disabilities as they face the consequences of school closures
but also provides educational agencies with flexibility in providing alternative, equivalent placements for its students. It may also encourage
out-of-court agreements that help school authorities avoid IDEA liability, thus benefitting parents by circumventing the need for costly, timeconsuming litigation necessary to secure their child’s educational placement and services.

